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present by express or implied invitation.47 The language of Piggly Wiggly
leaves uncertain whether liability is predicated upon the common law duty
or whether a new exception of a nondelegable duty is created. 8
It should be noted that the Piggly Wiggly case failed to resolve whether
negligent acts of a similarly situated security service would result in liability to the employer. Repeated statements that the case concerns the intentional tort of false imprisonment may be found in the opinion." The court
approaches the question of liability, however, from the direction of the
traditional nondelegable duty exception, which speaks of negligence. 0 It
would be hard to conceive of any rational justification for distinguishing
the decisions assessing liability for an intentional tort from those involving
negligence by the contractor. If it is unconscionable to immunize the contractee "from the responsibilities imposed by law," there can be no reason
why the employer of a negligent independent contractor should be allowed
to insulate himself from liability."'
The court in Piggly Wiggly has followed the trend established by other
jurisdictions in finding the retail employer of an independent contractor
liable. As might be expected, however, the complexities of the independent
contractor rule have prevented a clear and certain ruling. The Texas
Supreme Court's disposition of the Piggly Wiggly case ensures that the law
regarding liability of an employer for an independent contractor's tort will
require further refinement.
Chris A. Hale

MEDICAL MALPRACTICE-"Captain of the Ship" Doctrine
Surgeon Is Not Automatically Liable for
-Operating
Assistant's Negligence
Sparger v. Worley Hosptial, Inc.,
547 S.W.2d 582 (Tex. 1977).
Plaintiff Sylvia Caldwell brought suit against Dr. C. F. Sparger and
Worley Hospital, Inc. to recover for personal injuries caused by the negligence of hospital nurses that resulted in the operating physician's failure
to remove a sponge from within the plaintiff following surgery. Based upon
47. Comment, Responsibility for the Torts of an Independent Contractor, 39 YALE L.J.
861, 869 (1930).
48. See Dupree v. Piggly Wiggly Shop Rite Foods, Inc., 542 S.W.2d 882, 890 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Corpus Christi 1976, writ refd n.r.e.).
49. Id. at 888-90 (passim).
50. Id. at 890.
51. Id. at 889.
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jury findings that Dr. Sparger was not personally negligent and that the
nurses were not his borrowed servants, the trial court entered judgment
against Worley Hospital. The hospital appealed and the Amarillo Court
of Civil Appeals reversed, finding that, as "captain of the ship," Dr. Sparger was vicariously liable for the negligence of the nurses.' The court,
therefore, held that Dr. Sparger and the hospital were jointly liable. The
hospital again appealed, asking that Dr. Sparger be held solely liable.
HELD-Reversed. A surgeon is not automatically liable for the acts of
hospital personnel who assist him in an operation; rather, his liability
depends upon the application of general agency principles.2
Tort liability ordinarily rests on the actor's own misconduct.' Agency
law, however, imposes vicarious liability upon a master for certain torts
committed by his servant.' This policy stems from the practicality of
reaching the master's "deep pocket"' and of encouraging him to effectively
supervise his servants. It is imposed regardless of the master's personal
innocence.'
Occasionally an admittedly negligent servant will have more than one
master,' in which case liability flows to the master who had the right to
control the particular negligent action causing the injury.' Thus, a servant
who is within the short term employ of a second master as to a given task
is a "borrowed servant" for whom the second master is responsible
During an operation the nurse is within the general employ of a hospital
even though she is obeying the specific instructions of the surgeon. Early
decisions did not find the borrowed servant theory applicable in this situation, 10 but instead based liability on the issue of the surgeon's personal
negligence."I The leading case for the proposition that a jury may find that
1. Worley Hosp., Inc. v. Caldwell, 529 S.W.2d 639, 643 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1975),
rev'd sub noma.Sparger v. Worley Hosp., Inc., 547 S.W.2d 582 (Tex. 1977).
2. Sparger v. Worley Hosp., Inc., 547 S.W.2d 582, 585 (Tex. 1977).
3. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 1, at 6 (4th ed. 1971).
4. P. MECHEM, OUTLINES OF THE LAW OF AGENCY § 349, at 237 (4th ed. 1952).
5. T. BATY, VICARIOUS LABILTY 29 (1916), quoted in P. MECHEM, OUTLINES OF THE LAW OF
AGENCY § 351, at 238 (4th ed. 1952).
6. Laski, The Basis of Vicarious Liability, 26 YALE L.J. 105, 109 (1916); Mechem,
Employer's Liability, 4 ILL. L. REV. 243, 246 (1909). See generally P. MECHEM, OUTLINES OF
THE LAW OF AGENCY §§ 349-63 (4th ed. 1952).
7. P. MECHEM, OUTLINES OF THE LAW OF AGENCY §§ 453-68 (4th ed. 1952).
8. Skogland, Borrowed Servants, 76 CoM. L.J. 307, 309-11 (1971); Smith, Scope of the
Business: The Borrowed Servant Problem, 38 MICH. L. REv. 1222, 1225 (1940); Comment, The
Loaned Servant Doctrine, 29 TENN. L. REV. 448, 448-50 (1962).
9. J. A. Robinson Sons, Inc. v. Wigart, 431 S.W.2d 327, 334 (Tex. 1968); Producers
Chem. Co. v. McKay, 366 S.W.2d 220, 225 (Tex. 1963); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §
227 (1958).
10. Harris v. Fall, 177 F. 79, 84-85 (7th Cir. 1910); Guell v. Tenney, 159 N.E. 451 (Mass.
1928); Perionowsky v. Freeman, 176 Eng. Rep. 873, 875 (Q.B. 1866). See generally Annot.,
60 A.L.R. 147 (1929); Annot., 27 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1174-75 (1910).
11. Spears v. McKinnon, 270 S.W. 524, 526 (Ark. 1925); Akridge v. Noble, 41 S.E. 78
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a surgeon had the necessary type of control within the operating room to
make assisting hospital personnel his borrowed servants is Aderhold v.
Bishop,'" a decision which today is almost universally accepted.' 3 Its initial
popularity was partly attributable to the fact that most hospitals were
enjoying either charitable 4 or governmental 5 immunity and many courts
found it more equitable to assess damages against the blameless surgeon
than to let the innocent plaintiff go without compensation for his injury."6
In 1949 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopted the borrowed servant
approach in McConnell v. Williams, 7 analogizing that an operating surgeon is "in the same complete charge of those who are present and assisting
him as is the captain of a ship over all on board."'" From this phrase the
"captain of the ship" doctrine arose. The doctrine extends the borrowed
servant theory by stating that a surgeon has absolute control over all
personnel within the operating room as a matter of law and, therefore, is
vicariously liable for their negligence.'" This reasoning is consistent with
the argument that the surgeon performs the operation for financial gain
(Ga. 1902); Palmer v. Humiston, 101 N.E. 283, 285 (Ohio 1913); Annot., 65 A.L.R. 1023, 1026
(1930). Failure to remove a sponge or other foreign object was often found to be negligence
per se on the part of the surgeon. Saucier v. Ross, 73 So. 49, 50 (Miss. 1916); Moore v. Ivey,
264 S.W. 283 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1924), rev'd on other grounds, 277 S.W. 106 (Tex.
Comm'n App. 1925, jdgmt adopted); McCormick v. Jones, 278 P. 181 (Wash. 1929). Other
cases held the surgeon liable for failure to remove a foreign object upon a jury finding of
personal negligence. Houston Clinic v, Busch, 64 S.W.2d 1103, 1104-05 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Galveston 1933, writ dism'd); Hackler v. Ingram, 196 S.W. 279, 281 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1917, writ reffd); see Denton v. Carrell, 138 S.W.2d 878 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas), rev'd on other grounds, 138 Tex. 145, 157 S.W.2d 878 (Tex. 1942).
12. 221 P. 752 (Okla. 1923).
13. E.g., Alves v. Ryan, 64 P.2d 409, 420 (Cal. 1936); Davis v. Potter, 2 P.2d 318, 320
(Idaho 1938); McConnell v. Williams, 65 A.2d 243, 247 (Pa. 1949); D. LOUISELL & H. WILLIAMS,
1 MEDICAL MALPRACTICE § 16.05 (1973); Annot., 12 A.L.R.3d 1017, 1028 (1967).
14. Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 128; 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914),
overruled, Bing v. Thunig, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3, 12 (1957); Watkins v. Southcrest Baptist Church,
399 S.W.2d 530, 534 (Tex. 1966), overruled, Howle v. Camp Amon Carter, 470 S.W.2d 629,
630 (Tex. 1971). See generally Zollman, Damage Liabilityof CharitableInstitutions, 19 MICH.

L.

REV.

395 (1921).

15. Gibbons v. United States, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 269, 274 (1868); City of Dallas v. Smith,
130 Tex. 225, 234, 107 S.W.2d 872, 877 (1937). See generally Borchard, Government Liability
in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1 (1924).
16. Thomas v. Hutchinson, 275 A.2d 23, 27 (Pa. 1971); L. REGAN, DOCTOR AND PATIENT
AND THE LAw 367 (2d ed. 1971); Note, Pennsylvania's Captain-of-the-Ship Doctrine:A MidTwentieth Century Anachronism, 71 DICK. L. REv. 432, 442 (1967).
17. 65 A.2d 243, 247-48 (Pa. 1949).
18. Id. at 246.
19. Mazer v. Lipschutz, 327 F.2d 42, 46-49 (3d Cir. 1963); Rockwell v. Stone, 173 A.2d
48, 51 (Pa. 1961); Note, Separationof Responsibility in the OperatingRoom: The Borrowed
Servant, the Captain of the Ship, and the Scope of Surgeons' Vicarious Liability, 49 NOTRE
DAME LAw. 933 (1974).
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and should be financially liable when the patient is injured due to a nurse's
negligence.20
A basic policy issue in the area of medical malpractice is the determination of how the patient's safety can best be served.2' The "captain of the
ship" doctrine places liability on the person found to be in immediate
control-the surgeon.2" Even if a hospital has improperly trained its nurses
this theory makes it the surgeon's responsibility to see that they correctly
perform their duties or operate in another hospital. 3
Early Texas cases held the surgeon liable on the grounds of negligent
supervision rather than upon the theory of vicarious liability.24 McKinney
v. Tromly"5 was the first Texas case to extend the borrowed servant doctrine to the operating room. It has also been construed as implying acceptance of the "captain of the ship" concept, 2 leading subsequent Texas cases
to apply the doctrine in fact, if not in name.
In 1975, however, two cases, Worley Hospital Inc. v. Caldwell 28 and
20. Note, Separation of Responsibility in the OperatingRoom: The Borrowed Servant,
the Captainof the Ship, and the Scope of the Surgeons' Vicarious Liability, 49 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 933, 947 (1974); Note, The Borrowed Servant Doctrine as it Applies to Operating
Surgeons, 19 Sw. L.J. 179, 186-87 (1965).
21. Aderhold v. Bishop, 221 P. 752, 755 (Okla. 1923).
22. Schuler v. Berger, 275 F. Supp. 120, 125 (E.D. Pa. 1967), aff'd, 395 F.2d 212 (3d Cir.
1968); Nicholson v. Sisters of Charity of Providence, 463 P.2d 861, 862 (Ore. 1970); Thomas
v. Hutchinson, 275 A.2d 23, 27 (Pa. 1971); McConnell v. Williams, 65 A.2d 243, 246-48 (Pa.
1949).
23. Mazer v. Lipschutz, 327 F.2d 42, 50-51 (3d Cir. 1963); Yorston v. Pennell, 153 A.2d
255, 260 (Pa. 1959).
24. Thompson v. Barnard, 142 S.W.2d 238, 240 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1940), aff'd, 138
Tex. 277, 158 S.W.2d 486 (1942); Moore v. Ivey, 264 S.W. 283, 288 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston
1924), rev'd on other grounds, 277 S.W. 106 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1925, jdgmt adopted). The
Moore court imposed a nondelegable duty upon the surgeon to use all possible care during
the operation and held that he could not evade liability for leaving sponges within the patient
by depending upon nurses to account for them. 264 S.W. at 288; cf. Edwards v. West Tex.
Hosp., 89 S.W.2d 801, 811-13 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1935, writ dism'd) (partnership
found between surgeon and hospital where patient was in the care of both).
25. 386 S.W.2d 564 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1964, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
26. The implication was a tenuous one, resting primarily upon the quotations and cases
relied upon in support of the decision. Sesselman v. Muhlenberg Hosp., 306 A.2d 474, 476
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1973); Martin v. Perth Amboy Gen. Hosp., 250 A.2d 40, 47 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1969); Perdue, The Law of Texas Medical Malpractice,11 Hous. L. REV.
302, 347 (1974); cf. Note, The Borrowed Servant Doctrine as It Applies to OperatingSurgeons,
19 Sw. L.J. 179, 184 (1965).
27. Webb v. Jorns, 488 S.W.2d 407, 411 (Tex. 1972) (surgeon conceded vicarious liability); Harle v. Krchnak, 422 S.W.2d 810, 814 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1967, writ
ref'd n.r.e.) (without discussion). One commentator upon review of the cases stated that "the
'captain of the ship' doctrine appears to be firmly established in Texas." Perdue, The Law
of Texas Medical Malpractice, 11 Hous. L. REv. 302, 347 (1974); cf. Miller v. Hood, 536
S.W.2d 278, 283 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (differentiating
between operating room and nonoperating room situations).
28. 529 S.W.2d 639 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1975), rev'd sub nom. Sparger v. Worley
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5
reached contrary results regarding the doctrine. The
Ramone v. Mani,"
Amarillo Court of Civil Appeals in Caldwell applied the "captain of the
ship" doctrine by name and held the defendant surgeon vicariously liable
as a matter of law, notwithstanding a jury finding that the nurses were not
his borrowed servants." The Ramone case, in contrast, rejected the doctrine by holding that a surgeon would not be vicariously liable absent a
jury finding that the hospital personnel were his borrowed servants.', The
Texas Supreme Court granted writs of error in both and decided them as
companion cases, with Sparger v. Worley Hospital, Inc. 3 being the lead
decision.
In Spargerthe respondent surgeon suggested that a distinction be made
between the different types of duties performed by nurses within the operating room, with the hospital being held liable for some and the surgeon
for others.13 The petitioner, however, asserted that a surgeon is vicariously
liable for the actions of the nurses in the operating room performed under
his supervision and during his presence.3 4 The hospital argued further that,
regardless of the applicability of the "captain of the ship" doctrine, the
surgeon had an absolute right to control the nurses during the operation
and, therefore, was liable for their acts as a matter of law under the
"borrowed servant" principle of agency. 5

Hosp., Inc., 547 S.W.2d 582 (Tex. 1977).
29. 535 S.W.2d 654 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1975), aff'd, 20 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 149 (Jan.
12, 1977).
30. Worley Hosp., Inc. v. Caldwell, 529 S.W.2d 639, 641 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1975), rev'd sub noma. Sparger v. Worley Hosp., Inc., 547 S.W.2d 582 (Tex. 1977).
31. Ramone v. Mani, 535 S.W.2d 654, 657 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1975), aff'd, 20
Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 149 (Jan. 12, 1977).
32. 547 S.W.2d 582 (Tex. 1977).
33. Brief for Appellee at 39, Worley Hosp., Inc. v. Caldwell, 529 S.W.2d 639, (Tex.
Civ. App.-Amarillo 1975), rev'd sub nom. Sparger v. Worley Hosp., Inc., 547 S.W.2d 582
(Tex. 1977). Respondent urged that he was responsible only for the medical tasks of the nurses
which require training and skill and are under the direct supervision of the surgeon. Id. at
39. As to administrative tasks requiring no skill and done in accordance with prescribed
hospital regulations, the hospital should be responsible. Respondent contended that the
counting of sponges by the nurses was an administrative duty. Id. at 43; see Buzan v. Mercy
Hosp., Inc., 203 So. 2d 11, 13 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967); Tyler v. Touro Infirmary, 207 So.
2d 235, 242 (La. Ct. App. 1968); Robertson v. Maher, 177 So. 2d 412, 417 (La. Ct. App. 1965);
Comment, The Hospital-PhysicianRelationship: Hospital Responsibility for Malpracticeof
Physicians, 50 WASH. L. REv. 385, 403-08 (1975).
34. Application for Writ of Error at 13-16, Sparger v. Worley Hosp., Inc., 547 S.W.2d
582 (Tex. 1977), citing Harle v. Krchnak, 422 S.W.2d 810 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.); McKinney v. Tromly, 386 S.W.2d 564 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler
1964, writ refd n.r.e.); Thompson v. Barnard, 142 S.W.2d 238, 240 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco
1940), afj'd, 138 Tex. 277, 158 S.W.2d 486 (Tex. 1942); Moore v. Ivey, 264 S.W. 283, 288 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Galveston 1924), rev'd on other grounds, 277 S.W. 106 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1925,
jdgmt adopted).
35. Application for Writ of Error at 22-23, Sparger v. Worley Hosp., Inc., 547 S.W.2d
582 (Tex. 1977), citing J. A. Robinson Sons, Inc. v. Wigart, 431 S.W.2d 327 (Tex. 1968); cf.
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The Texas Supreme Court reversed the Amarillo Court of Civil Appeals
and expressly rejected the "captain of the ship" doctrine, holding that an
operating surgeon's vicarious liability must be measured by standards
common to other employers." The decision of the majority was founded on
a desire to apply the burden of vicarious liability uniformly by making the
requisite right to control as much a question of fact for sugeons as for other
short term employers. 7 The rationale was that if a jury found a surgeon
did not have the right to control the particular action of the nurse, then
the principles of agency should not make him liable for it.3"
In abolishing the "captain of the ship" doctrine, the court noted that the
doctrine did not conform to present realities and was an inequitable anomaly of agency principles. It suggested that by applying the borrowed servant concept instead, both of these disadvantages could be remedied. Accordingly, a surgeon will still be liable for the negligence of operating room
personnel over whom he has control, but the issue of control is now a
question of fact for the jury."
Having determined that it was confronted with a borrowed servant problem, the majority upheld the jury's finding that the nurses were not Dr.
Sparger's borrowed servants." The court relied on testimony that the surgeon neither selected the nurses nor interfered with the hospital's prescribed method of counting sponges." This testimony was held sufficient
to prevent a judgment notwithstanding the verdict from being rendered
against the surgeon." On motion for rehearing the court conceded that it
Burke v, Washington Hosp. Center, 475 F.2d 364, 365-66 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (nurse's erroneous
sponge count did not relieve surgeon of his nondelegable duty of removing sponges from
patient).
36. Sparger v. Worley Hosp., Inc., 547 S.W.2d 582 (Tex. 1977).
37. Id. at 585.
38. Id. at 585. Justice Johnson, in a dissenting opinion, argued that the doctrine was
necessary to make the law conform to the expectations of the patient and of society. The
patient chooses a surgeon whom he expects to take every precaution possible to ensure his
safety. To hold, then, that the surgeon was not in charge is inconsistent with that expectation.
Justice Johnson further felt that the doctrine was based upon a judicial recognition of the
surgeon's inherent right to control whether or not he exercised it, and if in fact he did not
have it, then "on the theory that the surgeon was negligent for failing to insist upon the right
to control." Id. at 587 (dissenting opinion); cf. W. BALLINGER, J. TREYBAL, & A. VosE,
ALEXANDER'S CARE OF THE PATIENT IN SURGERY

24 (5th ed. 1972), which states in a sample

nursing procedure manual that "[tihe surgeon shall be responsible for the total medical care
of his patient and retains all the obligations and authority. . . in the operating room .
Id.at 25.
39. Sparger v. Worley Hosp., Inc., 547 S.W.2d 582 (Tex. 1977).
40. Id.at 585.
41. Id.at 586.
42. Id. at 585-86.
43. Id.at 586. The decision to limit the surgeon's liability may also have roots in the
policy of spreading the cost of medical malpractice. The present furor over the cost of physician's malpractice insurance has coincided with a reduction in the legal immunities of hospi-
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was without jurisdiction to enter any finding upon the evidence without
first allowing the Amarillo Court of Civil Appeals to apply the appropriate
rules of law to the facts."
The importance of the majority's initial evidentiary ruling lies in its
indication as to the principles to be applied in determining whether a
borrowed servant relationship exists between a surgeon and a nurse. None
of the testimony referred to as supporting the jury finding asserted that the
surgeon did not have the right to control the manner of performing the
procedures.45 Rather, the testimony most favorable to the surgeon merely
indicated it would have been inconvenient or difficult for him to have
exercised his right to command." Therefore, by refusing to find that the
nurses were borrowed servants as a matter of law, the majority applied an
actual control standard rather than the right to control standard of general
agency law.4"
The actual control standard may describe more realistically the relationships which exist in the operating room.4" Unlike a right to control standard, it may take into account that the surgeon is concerned with more
pressing matters than counting sponges and is often unable to directly
supervise the nurse. An undesirable result, however, is the loss of certainty which the law should provide. If the potential liability of the surgeon
and hospital is conditioned upon their exercise of control, the patient's
tals. Bing v. Thunig, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3, 12 (1957); Howle v. Camp Amon Carter, 470 S.W.2d
629, 630 (Tex. 1971) (ending charitable immunity doctrine in Texas); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT.
ANN. art. 6252-19 (1970 & Supp. 1976-1977) (restricting governmental immunities).
44. Sparger v. Worley Hosp., Inc., 547 S.W.2d 582, 589 (Tex. 1977) (on rehearing).
45. Id. at 587 (dissenting opinion). Dr. Sparger and two nurses all testified that nurses
are supposed to follow the surgeon's orders during an operation. Id. at 587-89 (dissenting
opinion).
46. Id. at 587. The nurses were within the general employ of the hospital, assigned to
the operation and to the specific duties by the hospital, and performed the specific duties
(counting sponges) in a hospital prescribed method. Id. at 585-86.
47. The right to control standard was explained in J.A. Robinson Sons, Inc. v. Wigart,
431 S.W.2d 327 (Tex. 1968):
A borrowing employer may have the "right of control of the manner in which the
employees perform the services necessary to accomplishment of their ultimate obligation" and still not control all the details of their work. For example, -a truck driver
might remain under the direction and control of his general employer in regard to the
details of caring for his equipment and operating in a safe manner, and still be a special
or loaned employee of one who was directing or controlling the particular activity
which resulted in an injury.
Id. at 334. In Sparger the doctor testified that in ordering a second sponge count he had
departed from hospital procedures. Sparger v. Worley Hosp., Inc., 547 S.W.2d 582, 589 (Tex.
1977) (dissenting opinion). But see Martin v. Perth Amboy Gen. Hosp., 250 A.2d 40, 47-48
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1969) (nurses not borrowed employees of surgeon until ordered to
depart from hospital prescribed procedures).
48. Bria v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 220 A.2d 29, 31 (Conn. 1966); Collins v. Hand, 246 A.2d
398, 405 (Pa. 1968).
49. Bradford & Carlson, Captain of the Ship, 27 INs. COUNSEL J. 156, 156-58 (1960).
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welfare may become subordinate to their desire to protect themselves from
liability. 0 For example, an actual control standard subjects to liability the
surgeon who exercises careful control and supervision while exempting the
surgeon who merely lets the hospital personnel work in their accustomed
manner."' Additionally, if the hospital seeks to protect itself by instructing
the nurses to follow only prescribed procedures, the surgeon may find that
those present will not in fact obey his instructions. By fixing liability with
certainty, the "captain of the ship" doctrine at least kept considerations
of liability out of the operating room and allowed those present to practice
medicine rather than law.
Nevertheless, the Sparger decision represents an improvement in Texas
medical malpractice law in that it replaces the rigid "captain of the ship"
concept with the more flexible borrowed servant doctrine. If trial courts do
not show a greater willingness to issue directed verdicts on the issue of
vicarious liability when the facts are not in dispute, however, juries may
return verdicts based upon personal negligence or actual control rather
than the correct standard of right to control.5" The actual control approach
utilized in Sparger may result in equitable decisions in isolated cases, but
it completely ignores the fact that respondeat superior is an instrument of
public policy rather than of individual justice. Under the standard applied
by the court, the best interests of the various professionals in the operating
room may no longer coincide with those of the patient. The policy of
promoting the patient's welfare is ill served if the actual control standard
is employed because it discourages the surgeon from actively supervising
assisting personnel by conditioning his liability upon the exercise of his
right to control. Therefore, the right to control standard seems to be the
preferable method of dealing with the borrowed servant problem since it
conforms to the realities of modern medical practice and provides a needed
measure of legal certainty in the operating room.
Mark H. Miller
50. HEW,

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S COMMISSION ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE

2 (1973).

The report found that "[t]he fear of being sued permeates the entire health-care community" and that as a consequence the costs, methods, and patterns of medical care are
greatly affected by the problem. Id.
51. Note, The Borrowed Servant Doctrine as it Applies to Operating Surgeons, 19 Sw.
L.J. 179, 185-86 (1965).
52. The right to control standard does not automatically fix sole liability upon the
surgeon. If the hospital also has the right to control the assisting nurse then it should be
jointly liable with the surgeon. Dickerson v. American Sugar Ref. Co., 211 F.2d 200, 203 (3d
Cir. 1954); Tongic v. Wagner, 329 A.2d 497, 501 (Pa. 1974); Worley Hosp., Inc. v. Caldwell,
529 S.W.2d 639, 643 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1975), rev'd sub nor. Sparger v. Worley
Hosp., Inc., 547 S.W.2d 582 (Tex. 1977); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 226 (1957).
Further, the trend toward specialization in medicine has created situations where the surgeon
does not have the right to control all personnel within the operating room. Thompson v.
Lillehei, 164 F. Supp. 716, 720-22 (D. Minn. 1958), aff'd, 273 F.2d 376 (8th Cir. 1959);
Marvulli v. Elshire, 103 Cal. Rptr. 461, 463-65 (Ct. App. 1972).
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